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Tested the hypothesis that aggressive boys’ tendency to attribute hostile intentions to
peers is exacerbated in a negative emotional state. Twenty-nine highly aggressive
boys in special education, 12 moderately aggressive boys in regular education, and
16 nonaggressive boys in regular education inferred peers’ intentions in 8 vignettes
concerning ambiguous provocation by peers. Mild negative emotions were induced
by unjust loss of a manipulated computer game. Half the vignettes were completed in
this negative emotional state. After completion of all vignettes, the game was played
again and won to reinduce positive feelings. Self-ratings of feelings obtained through-
out the study showed the manipulations consecutively induced negative and positive
feelings. Negative feelings increased hostile attribution of intent in the highly aggres-
sive group. Highly and moderately aggressive boys responded more aggressively than
nonaggressive boys.
Aggressive behavior problems are associated with
rejection by peers, domestic conflict, and a life history
of aversive experiences (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Dishion,
French, & Patterson, 1995). Consequently, boys with
aggressive behavior problems experience negative
emotions more frequently than their peers. These fre-
quent and intense negative feelings are not only dis-
concerting; they may also impair these boys’ social
functioning.
According to Dodge (1985), a negative emotional
state makes aggressive boys more prone to attribute
hostile intentions to other children they interact with,
thereby making aggressive boys behave more aggres-
sively than they would in a neutral emotional state.
Dodge hypothesized that aggressive children may have
been classically conditioned by frequent experiences
of co-occurring negative feelings and hostility from
others. Being so conditioned, negative feelings may
trigger an expectation of oncoming hostile, threatening
behavior from others. This hypothesis seems plausible,
given the fact that many children with aggressive be-
havior problems have histories of abuse, neglect, and
rejection (Coie & Dodge, 1998) and exhibit a tendency
to attribute hostile intentions to peers in ambiguous sit-
uations (Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, &
Monshouwer, 2002). Yet no study has directly tested
whether negative feelings do actually increase aggres-
sive boys’ tendency to attribute hostile intentions.
To illustrate the hypothesized effect of negative
feelings on attribution of intent in aggressive boys, re-
views (see, for example, Coie & Dodge, 1998; Crick &
Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1993) generally refer to a study
by Dodge and Somberg (1987). In this study, groups of
aggressive–rejected and nonaggressive–popular boys
individually rated the intentions of peers in hypotheti-
cal situations before and after a threat manipulation.
This threat manipulation was conducted by the experi-
menter. Halfway through the experiment, the experi-
menter explained he was going to get another boy who
would join them and left the room. Through an inter-
com, the participant then overheard the experimenter
argue with the boy who was to join them. This boy told
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the experimenter that he did not like the participant and
would get into a fight with him. In reality—but un-
known to the participant—there was no other boy, just
an audiotape that was played through the intercom sys-
tem to make participants feel threatened. After this
threat manipulation, participants completed the inten-
tion ratings. The threat manipulation in this study had
an effect on attribution of intent. There was no differ-
ence between groups in attribution of hostile intent be-
fore the threat manipulation, whereas after the manipu-
lation the aggressive–rejected group attributed more
hostile intentions than the nonaggressive group.
Dodge and Somberg’s (1987) study provided evi-
denceofaneffectof threatsbyapeeronattributionof in-
tent. It did not, however, provide unambiguous evidence
for a causal role of negative emotions in exacerbating
hostile attributions of intent in aggressive boys, for two
reasons. First, the manipulation of emotion by means of
threats from a peer did not only invoke negative emo-
tions but also alerted participants to the fact that other
boys may actually act with hostile intent. Thus, the ef-
fectof themanipulationmaynothavebeencausedby in-
duction of negative feelings but because representations
of hostile intent became more accessible in memory.
Possibly participants were reminded that hostile behav-
iors by peers do occur in reality and were therefore more
likely to presume hostile intent in the vignettes they
rated after the threat manipulation. The plausibility of
this alternative explanation of Dodge and Somberg’s
findings is underscored by two studies concerning the
effects of priming on hostile attribution of intent. Kirsh
(1998) demonstrated an increase in hostile attributions
of intent in boys directly after playing violent video
games.GrahamandHudley(1994)askedparticipants to
complete tasks similar to those used in the Dodge and
Somberg study. However, just before participants
started the attribution of intent tasks, they were asked to
memorize sentences describing social provocations
with clearly hostile or clearly benign intent. Priming
with hostile intent resulted in a marked increase in hos-
tile attribution by the nonaggressive participants. This
result led Graham and Hudley to plead for disentangling
theeffectsofprimingfromtheeffectsofemotionsbyus-
ing “variables that are affectively negatively toned (e.g.,
potentially evoking negative evaluations) but unrelated
to the primed construct” (p. 371). Their suggestion is
followed in this study.
Second, the relevance of the Dodge and Somberg
(1987) study to aggressive behavior is hard to assess, be-
cause they used a combined selection criterion of ag-
gressiveness and rejection by peers. That is, boys were
selectedon thebasisofcombinedaggressivenessandre-
jection ratings. Even though aggressive behavior is
strongly associated with rejection by peers, the two con-
structs are not identical. Both rejected nonaggressive
boys and popular aggressive boys exist and show differ-
ent social information processing (SIP) patterns (Asar-
now & Callan, 1985; Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham,
1999; Waldman, 1996). Due to the simultaneous selec-
tion on rejection and aggressiveness, it is impossible to
determine whether group differences in attribution of
intent were due to aggressiveness or rejection. Rejected
boys, by definition, have more personal experience with
other peers’ hostile intentions toward them than other
boys. Therefore, hostile attributions may be more easily
primed, or even be “chronically accessible” (Graham &
Hudley, 1994) in rejected boys. Thus, the effect found in
the Dodge and Somberg study may actually be an in-
creased effect of priming in rejected boys, rather than an
effect of emotion in aggressive boys.
In sum, the Dodge and Somberg (1987) study
showed an intriguing pattern of findings that could be
clarified by disconfounding negative emotion from
priming and aggression from rejection. As far as we
know, the hypothesis that negative emotion by itself
causes more hostile attribution of intent in aggressive
boys has not been tested to date.
The aim of this study was to assess whether boys
with aggressive behavior problems do attribute more
hostile intentions to peers when they are in a negative
emotional state. To induce negative emotion without
priming social expectations, we induced negative feel-
ings through an event that was not associated with hos-
tile social interaction. To this end, we experimentally
manipulated participants’ performance in a computer
game. To disentangle aggressive behavior and rejec-
tion, participants were selected purely on (absence of)
aggressive behavior, and social problems were statisti-
cally controlled for when necessary. Clinical relevance
of the study was maximized by including participants
with severe aggressive behavior problems in special
education for hard-to-manage children.
A secondary aim of the study was to test whether
the expected increases in hostile attribution were asso-
ciated with increases in aggressiveness of responses to
hypothetical vignettes concerning social conflicts. Ac-
cording to SIP models (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge,
1985), aggressiveness of responses to provocative so-
cial interactions with peers depends on attribution of
intent to these peers. Numerous studies have demon-
strated a relation between attribution of intent and ag-
gressiveness of responses to ambiguous provocation
vignettes (e.g., Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, & Brown,
1986). If this relation is indeed causal, an increase in
hostile attribution of intent caused by a negative emo-
tional state should in turn cause an increase in aggres-
sive responses to such vignettes.
Method
Design
Three groups of boys with different degrees of ag-
gressive behavior problems participated in the study.
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The highly aggressive group (HIGH) consisted of boys
referred to special education for aggressive behavior
problems. The moderately aggressive group (MOD-
ERATE) consisted of boys in regular education with
aggressive behavior problems. The nonaggressive group
(NON) consisted of boys in regular education with
virtually no aggressive behavior problems. Each par-
ticipant completed two conditions: a neutral-emotion
condition prior to emotion manipulation and a nega-
tive-emotion condition following emotion manipula-
tion. Thus, the experimental design consisted of ag-
gressive behavior problems as between-participants
factor with three levels (HIGH / MODERATE / NON),
and emotion as within-participants factor with two lev-
els (neutral / negative).
Participants
Fifty-seven boys ages 9 to 13 participated in the
study. The highly aggressive group (HIGH) consisted of
29 boys referred to special education for aggressive be-
havior problems. In the Netherlands, children are only
referred to this type of education if the severity of their
behavior problems significantly impairs social func-
tioning and prohibits participation in regular education,
according to parents, teachers, and diagnosticians.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants
and their parents. The moderately aggressive group
(MODERATE) consisted of 12 boys in regular educa-
tion with teacher-rated externalizing behavior problems
scores on the Teacher’s Report Form (TRF; Achenbach,
1991; see Measures section) in the borderline or clinical
range. The nonaggressive group (NON) consisted of 16
boys fromthesameclassroomsas theMODERATEpar-
ticipantswithTRFexternalizingproblemsscoresbelow
the Dutch mean. Groups did not differ in mean age
(overall M = 11 years, SD = 1.2 year).
Instruments
Behavior problems. Teachers filled out the
Dutch version of the TRF (Achenbach, 1991; for the
Dutch version, see Verhulst, van der Ende, & Koot,
1997). The TRF contains 118 multiple-choice behavior
items and 2 open-answer questions. For each multi-
ple-choice item, teachers indicate 0 if the problem state-
ment is not true for the child, 1 if somewhat true, and 2 if
very often true. Achenbach reported high 15-day
test–retest reliability, 2-month stability, and validity for
this instrument. TRF items can be grouped into various
scales. In this study we used the externalizing problems,
aggressive behavior, and social problems scales. Norms
for Dutch children published by Verhulst et al. (1997)
were used to calculate normative T scores. T scores of 63
or higher, corresponding to the 90th percentile (the
so-called borderline and clinical ranges) on the exter-
nalizing problems scale were used as minimum cutoff
score for the MODERATE group. T scores of 50 or less
on the same scale, corresponding to the 50th percentile,
were used as maximum cutoff for participation in the
NON group.
Social Information Processing. Two parallel
sets of four audiotaped vignettes each (Orobio de Cas-
tro, 2000) were presented to participants in random or-
der. All vignettes concerned being hindered by a peer
whose intentions are ambiguous. This context is the
most important source of social conflict at school for
this population (Cuperus, 1997; Dodge, McClaskey, &
Feldman, 1985). To obtain relevant and ambiguous vi-
gnettes, observations of boys at a psychiatric institution
and consultation with staff were used to provide story
themes. The vignettes obtained from these story themes
were then tested in a pilot study with 15 boys in the psy-
chiatric clinic and 20 boys from regular schools near the
clinic. Only vignettes familiar to participants, invoking
self-reported negative affect and with sufficiently am-
biguousrepresentationof intent scores,wereused in this
study, as illustrated by this sample vignette:
Imagine: You and a boy in your class are taking turns
at a computer game. Now it’s your turn, and you are
doing great. You are reaching the highest level, but
you only have one life left. You never came this far be-
fore, so you are trying very hard. The boy you are
playing with watches the game over your shoulder. He
sees how far you have come. Then he shouts “Watch
out! You got to be fast now!” and he pushes a button.
But it was the wrong button, and now you have lost the
game!
To assess SIP, participants were asked three ques-
tions directly after listening to each vignette. First, they
were asked why the provocateur in the vignette acted
the way he did. Second, they were asked to specify
their answer on a 10-point rating scale ranging from 1
(to be nice) to 10 (to be mean). Third, participants were
asked to tell how they would respond if they would ac-
tually experience the events in the vignette.
Hostile attribution of intent was assessed with the
first two questions. Answers to the open-answer ques-
tion concerning the peer’s intention were coded as be-
nign (e.g., “he tried to help”); accidental (“he didn’t
mean to do it”); ambiguous (e.g., “maybe on purpose,
maybe not, it doesn’t say, does it?”); or hostile (e.g., “he
wants to make me lose”). By counting the number of vi-
gnettes in each condition with a “hostile” answer to this
question, a hostile attribution score was calculated with
a minimum of 0 (no hostile answer given) and a maxi-
mum of 4 (hostile answers given for each vignette in the
condition). To assess interrater reliabilities for the cod-
ing of answers to the hostile attribution questions, tran-
scriptions of 30 randomly selected boys’ answers were
coded independently by a second rater. Interrater agree-
ment was 94%, and Cohen’s kappa was .91.
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Ratings on the 10-point attribution rating, scales
were averaged over vignettes for each condition. Next,
aggregate pre- and postmanipulation hostile attribution
variables were constructed. To this end, the open-an-
swer and rating-scale attribution variables were stan-
dardized with the premanipulation means and standard
deviations and then averaged. Cronbach’s α for the ag-
gregate attribution variable was .79.
Response aggressiveness was assessed with the
third question. A response aggressiveness score was
calculated for each vignette by coding each response as
physical aggression (e.g., “punch him in the face”); de-
structive aggression (e.g., “break his game boy”); ver-
bal aggression (e.g., “call him dumbo”); coercion
(comprising direct action, threats, and commands; e.g.,
“if you don’t fix it, I’ll beat you up”); solution attempt
(e.g., “Shall I play again cause it wasn’t my fault?”); or
avoidance (e.g., “I’d just go away, and if he asked
where I went I’d say ‘to play somewhere else’”). In-
terrater agreement for these codes was 88%, with a Co-
hen’s kappa of .74.
In a previous study (see Orobio de Castro, 2000), re-
ferred aggressive and normal comparison boys rated
aggressiveness of the coded behavior categories. Find-
ings showed that, by weighting physical and destruc-
tive aggression with 2 points, verbal aggression and
coercion with 1 point, and solution attempts and avoid-
ance with zero points, an interval scale of response ag-
gressiveness could be created that matched the aggres-
siveness ratings by boys in regular and special education
closely. This procedure was also used in this study. Re-
sponses to each vignette were first coded separately.
Mean response aggressiveness scores were then calcu-
lated by averaging over the four vignettes in each con-
dition. Thus, we constructed response aggressiveness
variables with a minimum of zero (solution attempts or
avoidance in all vignettes) and a maximum of 2 (physi-
cal or destructive aggression in all vignettes). Cron-
bach’s α for response aggressiveness was .69.
Mood-o-meters. Participants’ feelings during
the experiment were assessed by means of “mood-o-
meters” for anger, sadness, and happiness. These are
10-point rating scales in the shape of thermometers
with a facial expression of the concerning emotion de-
picted above the scale.
Computer game “Hunchback.” A manipulated
computer game was used to induce negative and posi-
tive feelings in participants during the experiment. To
this end, we adapted the computer game “Hunchback
of Notre Dame.” R. Schmidt (Fireball Software, ltd.,
Norway) kindly made the Pascal source code for the
original game publicly available on the Internet.
“Hunchback” is a game for one player, who plays the
part of Quasimodo. To score points and win the game,
Quasimodo has to walk over a castle wall, climb a
tower, and free princess Esmeralda, who is imprisoned
there. Walking over the castle wall (see Figure 1),
Quasimodo is hindered by pitfalls, arrows, and can-
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Figure 1. Scene from computer game “Hunchback of Notre Dame” used to induce negative emotions.
nonballs. He has to avoid these obstacles by jumping
over them, or by not jumping into them while they fly
over his head. Compared to most contemporary com-
puter games, “Hunchback” is a simple and straightfor-
ward game. It requires the use of only two keys: the
right-shift key to walk and the space key to jump. Aim
and operation of the game were clear to all participants.
At thestartof thegame, the following instructionwas
shown on screen and read aloud by the experimenter:
In this game you are Quasimodo. Quasimodo wants to
walk over the castle wall toward the tower, where the
beautiful princess Esmeralda is imprisoned. To reach
her you have to pass obstacles and ring the tower bells.
Watch out for arrows, cannonballs, and pitfalls … Use
your left- and right-shift keys to walk, and the space
bar to jump.
—DO NOT PRESS ESCAPE, BECAUSE IT
ENDS THE GAME—
Shift and space keys were marked with colored
stickers and pointed out by the experimenter.
At the start of each game, each player possessed
three “lives.” If he was hit by an obstacle or fell into a
pit, one life was lost, and the game continued at the
same level. To reach Esmeralda, participants had to
complete five levels: two levels with approaching ob-
stacles, two levels with pits, and one level with both
pits and obstacles, respectively. On completion of the
fifth level, Esmeralda appeared in her tower, sur-
rounded by hearts, and music sounded.
To ensure the game was equally difficult for all par-
ticipants, we altered the game to automatically adapt to
each player’s skill. The game slowed down every time
a life was lost and became faster every time a level was
completed. Thus, the speed of the game adapted itself
to each player’s skill.
For this experiment, we made three versions of the
game: a practice version, a lose version, and a win ver-
sion. The practice version was not manipulated but
merely altered to adapt to each player’s skill, as de-
scribed previously. The lose version was manipulated to
ensure that each player would reach the last part of the
highest levelbysupplyinghimwithanew“bonus” life if
onlyone lifewas left.However,when theplayer reached
the last part of the highest level, a noise sounded, the
game stopped, and the message “Game over. Escape
pressed” appeared. If any button was pressed thereafter,
the game disappeared, and the seemingly official error
message “Escape pressed. Hunchback stopped, exit no.
457-30-521A” was shown.
By making the player unjustly lose the game mo-
ments before winning, we aimed to induce negative
emotions. We made a computer error the cause for los-
ing the game to ensure that the player could not attrib-
ute the induction of negative feelings to social causes
(like a peer or the experimenter) or his own fault. The
escape key was too far away from the game keys on the
keyboard for the participant to have accidentally hit the
key.
The win version of the game was again manipu-
lated, but this time to ensure that players could only
win the game. As in the lose version, participants al-
ways gained a new life if they only had a single life left.
This version allowed participants to complete the en-
tire game, free Esmeralda, and win a prize.
Procedure
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room
at their school. In a standardized instruction, partici-
pants were told they were going to listen to stories con-
cerning events they could experience any day and
would be asked what they would do if they actually ex-
perienced the stories. Participants were asked to imag-
ine they experienced the stories themselves. It was em-
phasized that no wrong answers could be given, and
participants were assured of the confidentiality of their
answers. Next, the experimenter referred to a personal
computer at a table in the same room, some distance
away from the table where participant and experi-
menter were seated, and promised the participant he
would be allowed to play a computer game during a
break in the interview.
Each boy participated in both the neutral emotion
and the negative-emotion condition, respectively. Each
condition consisted of four vignettes with the concom-
itant questions (see Measures section). In the neutral
condition, emotion was not manipulated. Participants
were merely asked to indicate their current feelings on
the mood-o-meters for anger, sadness, and happiness
and then proceeded to answer questions about a set of
four vignettes.
After completion of the neutral condition, partici-
pants were given a break to play the promised com-
puter game. In fact, this break served as the start of the
negative-emotion condition. Unknown to participants,
the break was used to induce negative feelings, as fol-
lows. First, the experimenter explained the game, and
the participant played the practice version of the game
(see Measures section). Once the participant under-
stood the game and finished a game, the experimenter
told the participant that she was actually doing a little
competition on this game and that the participant could
win one of several prizes if he would complete the next
game successfully. She then showed the participant
three different small prizes and asked the participant
which prize he would like to win (thus, we aimed to in-
crease the participant’s commitment to winning the
game). After the participant chose his favorite prize,
the game was started. However, this time the experi-
menter unobtrusively started the lose version of the
game. While the participant played the game, the ex-
perimenter went back to the interview table, where she
started to arrange her papers. When the participant in-
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evitably lost the game, the experimenter went to see
what happened. As she could not have seen why the
participant lost the game from the interview table
where she was seated, she told the participant that it
was too bad he lost but that she could not help it and
that he could not play again. She then told the partici-
pant they were going to continue the interview, and—
without further discussion about the game—proceeded
to interview the participant about the second set of four
vignettes.
When the negative-emotion condition was com-
pleted, the experimenter told the participant that he had
done so well that she would let him play the game
again. This time, she secretly started the win version of
the game. Therefore, after an adventurous trip through
all levels of the game, the participant won the game and
his favored prize. The participant was then asked to fill
out the mood-o-meters for how he felt when he had just
lost the game. Finally, he was asked to fill out yet an-
other set of mood-o-meters for how he currently felt,
was thanked for his cooperation, and was asked not to
tell other boys about the interview.
Results
Behavior Problems
Behavior problems were assessed with the TRF.
Linear contrasts were specified in ANOVA to test the
expected group differences on TRF scores for aggres-
siveness and externalizing behavior problems. Groups
differed in a linear fashion on TRF scores for aggres-
sive behavior, F(2, 55) = 36.47, p < .000, and ex-
ternalizing problems, F(2, 55) = 79.66, p < .000. Post
hoc group comparisons by means of Tukey’s HSD con-
firmed that mean T scores for aggressive behavior were
highest for the highly aggressive group (M = 73.9, SD
= 9.9), lower for the moderately aggressive group (M =
66.2, SD = 10.8), and lowest for the nonaggressive
group (M = 50.2, SD = .4), p = .022 and p < .000, re-
spectively. Mean T scores for externalizing problems
were also higher for the highly (M = 71.3, SD = 7.0)
than for the moderately (M = 64.5, SD = 9.3) aggres-
sive group, that in turn received higher scores than the
nonaggressive group (M = 42.8, SD = 4.5), ps .012 and
.001, respectively.
Groups also differed on teacher-rated social prob-
lems, F(2, 55) = 6.56, p = .003. Social problems
T-scores were higher in the highly (M = 64.7, SD = 7.7)
and moderately (M = 62.8, SD = 10.7) aggressive
groups than in the nonaggressive group (M = 53.6, SD
= 6.8) , ps < .01. The moderately and highly aggressive
group did not differ in social problems, p = .75. Ag-
gressive and externalizing behavior problems were re-
lated to social problems, with rs of .32, ps < .02. How-
ever, social problems were not related to any dependent
variable, neither before nor after the manipulation.
Therefore social problems were not controlled for in
further analyses.
Affect Manipulation
Table 1 shows mean mood-o-meter ratings of anger,
sadness, and happiness in the neutral condition, in the
negative-emotion condition, and at the end of the ex-
periment. To check whether the affect manipulation
equally induced negative feelings in all groups, mood-
o-meter scores for anger, sadness, and happiness were
used as dependent variables in three 3 × 2 analyses
of variance with Group (NON/MODERATE/HIGH)
as a between-participants factor and Condition (neu-
tral/negative) as a within-participants factor. After los-
ing the game, participants in all groups became more
angry, F(2, 54) = 37.95, p < .001, d1 = 1.91; more sad,
F(2, 54) = 10.36, p = .002, d = .81; and less happy, F(2,
54) = 66.34, p < .001, d = 1.65.
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Table 1. Emotion Ratings by Group and Condition
Condition
Neutral Negative After
Group Emotion M SD M SD M SD
Nonaggressive Anger .13 .50 3.44 2.76 .81 2.01
Sadness .25 1.00 1.25 1.61 1.00 2.16
Happiness 6.00 1.41 3.06 2.57 4.44 2.80
Moderate Anger .67 1.56 3.58 2.87 1.08 1.56
Sadness .83 1.34 2.17 2.59 .75 1.06
Happiness 5.58 1.44 1.92 1.93 4.17 2.72
High Anger .55 1.97 3.48 3.41 .03 .19
Sadness .55 1.30 1.62 3.09 .07 .26
Happiness 7.41 2.95 2.72 3.30 9.45 1.38
1For between-participants comparisons, effect size d is the dif-
ference between group means, expressed in standard deviations of
the nonaggressive group. For within-participants comparisons, ef-
fect size d is the difference between means expressed in premanipu-
lation standard deviations.
There was no main effect of, or interaction with,
group status, which indicates that emotional state and
the amount of negative emotion induced by the manip-
ulation were comparable across the three groups. Emo-
tional state after participation in the experiment did not
differ from emotional state prior to participation.
Hostile Attribution of Intent
and Response Aggressiveness
Tables 2 and 3 display mean hostile attribution of
intent and response aggressiveness scores in the neu-
tral and negative condition by the groups of nonag-
gressive, moderately aggressive, and highly aggressive
boys. The effects of the negative emotion induction on
hostile attribution and response aggressiveness were
tested in two 3 × 2 univariate analyses of variance with
group as between-participants factor and condition as
within-participants factor.
For hostile attribution of intent, a significant Group
× Condition interaction was found, F(2, 55) = 3.18, p =
.049; see Table 2. No premanipulation group effect was
found, whereas following the affect manipulation, the
two aggressive groups combined made more hostile at-
tributions than the nonaggressive group, F(1, 56) =
2,91, p = .047, d = .42. There was no condition main ef-
fect. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the negative
emotion induction increased hostile attribution of in-
tent only in the highly aggressive group, p = .020,
d = .46.
For response aggressiveness, a group main effect
was found, F(2, 55) = 8.82, p = .000; see Table 4. Post
hoc analyses with Tukey’s honestly significant differ-
ence procedure showed that the moderately and highly
aggressive groups responded more aggressively than
the nonaggressive group, whereas the two aggressive
groups did not differ in response aggressiveness. There
was no main effect of condition on response aggres-
siveness, nor was there a Group × Condition interac-
tion, F(2, 54) = 1.46, p = .241.
Thus, the mean increase in hostile attributions in the
highly aggressive group was not accompanied by an
increase in response aggressiveness. Exploratory anal-
yses revealed this nonfinding may be due to a ceiling
effect on response aggressiveness for some highly ag-
gressive boys. The increase in hostile attribution scores
following the induction of negative feelings was not
accompanied by an increase in response aggressive-
ness in 10 of the highly aggressive boys. Interestingly,
these 10 boys already responded significantly more ag-
gressively (M = 1.55, SD = .35) than the other highly
aggressive boys (M = .91, SD = .52) before negative
feelings were induced, t(1, 27) = 3.43, p = .002, d =
1.23. Recall that the maximum response aggressive-
ness score possible was 2, if all responses concerned
physical or destructive aggression. For these boys, the
high mean score of 1.55 before the effect manipulation
suggests that a ceiling effect made a further increase in
response aggressiveness due to the affect manipulation
unlikely. An increase in response aggressiveness due to
the affect manipulation was, however, possible for
highly aggressive boys with low premanipulation re-
sponse aggressiveness scores. An exploratory analysis
of the effect of condition on response aggressiveness
including only the nine highly aggressive boys with
premanipulation response aggressiveness scores below
1 did reveal a significant increase in response aggres-
siveness due to the affect manipulation (premanip-
ulation M = .44, SD = .30; postmanipulation M = .72,
SD = .36), t(1, 8) = 2.86, p = .011, d = .75. Note, how-
ever, that the 9 boys with low premanipulation scores
included in this exploratory analysis are—by defini-
tion—an unrepresentative subset of the highly aggres-
sive group and that the increase in response aggressive-
ness in this subgroup may be due to regression to the
mean. Results of this exploratory analysis should there-
fore be interpreted with care.
Discussion
The main aim of this study was to test whether the
tendency of boys with aggressive behavior problems to
attribute hostile intent is exacerbated by negative emo-
tions. Highly aggressive boys did indeed attribute more
hostile intent in a negative affective state, whereas
moderately and nonaggressive boys did not. This is the
first study to show that this effect occurs even when
negative emotion is induced without priming of neg-
ative intentions. Moreover, the effect occurred even
though only a modest degree of self-reported negative
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Table 2. Hostile Attribution of Intent by Group and
Condition
Group
High Moderate Non
Condition M SD M SD M SD
Neutral –.19a .91 .15 .89 .15 1.10
Negative .23ab 1.25 .35c .94bc –.21 1.12
Table 3. Response Aggressiveness by Group and Condition
Group
High Moderate Non
Condition M SD M SD M SD
Neutral 1.12a .57 1.02b .52 .52ab .34
Negative .93c .52 1.08d .48 .47cd .40
Note: Means with the same subscript are significantly different at
p < .05.
emotions was evoked in the participants and while the
negative affective state may not have lasted throughout
the entire negative-emotion condition.
The manipulated computer game proved an effec-
tive experimental manipulation. Participants’ emotion-
al states were adequately influenced from neutral to
negative and back to neutral. This experimental manip-
ulation has several advantages over other procedures to
influence children’s emotional state, such as imagining
emotional events, priming of emotional words or pic-
tures, or manipulated social interactions. The manipu-
lation used in this study does not depend on children’s
willingness or ability to imagine or self-induce emo-
tions, which may be particularly problematic with clin-
ically aggressive, hyperactive, or depressed children.
Furthermore, the procedure is standardized and auto-
matically adapts to children’s skills at the game, result-
ing in comparable changes in emotional state for all
participants. This is an important advantage over pro-
cedures that include standardized stimuli that may not
be equally relevant to all participants and over proce-
dures that require participants to recall idiosyncratic
emotional events that may differ in tone and severity
among participants. Finally, because the procedure
does not involve priming or presentation of stimuli re-
lated to the variables under study, effects of the manip-
ulation can be ascribed entirely to changes in emo-
tional state.
Before conducting this study, the ethical implica-
tions of deliberately inducing negative feelings in boys
were concisely discussed with teachers working in reg-
ular and special education, psychologists, psychia-
trists, and research staff. All people consulted agreed it
would be ethically permissible to manipulate emotions
by loss of a computer game due to a computer error, for
several reasons. First, losing a computer game (and
thereby not obtaining tangible rewards such as being
allowed to play again) is a stressful event that fre-
quently occurs to boys of this age anyway. Therefore,
losing the game in our experiment did not place an ex-
cessive additional burden on the boys. Second, we
minimized chances of boys blaming themselves for
losing the game by making losing the game the com-
puter’s fault. Third, we avoided unjust treatment of the
child by the experimenter that might have led the child
to attribute hostile intentions or carelessness to the
experimenter (or to adults in general), by making clear
to the child that, from her location, the experimenter
could not have seen whether the child pressed the
escape key or not and by the experimenter’s empathic
reaction to the child losing the game. Finally, by letting
each participant win the game and the prize at the end
of the experiment, we aimed to let participants experi-
ence the feeling that they were able to play well, to
alleviate negative feelings, and to end their participa-
tion positively. Induction of stronger negative emo-
tions—comparable to real-life stresses—would allow
for an even more valid test of the influence of negative
emotions on attribution of intent and aggressiveness.
We would, however, consider induction of more than
mildly negative feelings for research purposes
unethical.
Throughout the experiment, both aggressive groups
responded more aggressively to hypothetical vignettes
than the nonaggressive comparison group. The rele-
vance of the finding that negative emotions lead highly
aggressive boys to make more hostile attributions of in-
tent lies partly in the proposed relation with aggressive
responses. Unfortunately, the relation between in-
creases in hostile attributions and increases in response
aggressiveness could not be tested for all highly ag-
gressive boys, because of a ceiling effect on response
aggressiveness. For the subgroup of highly aggressive
boys with low premanipulation response aggressive-
ness scores, mean response aggressiveness did in-
crease following the affect manipulation. To unequivo-
cally establish whether the effect of the manipulation
on response aggressiveness was mediated by the in-
creases in negative affect and hostile attribution of in-
tent would require a mediation analysis. However, the
number of boys in this subgroup was too small to con-
duct such an analysis. Therefore, it remains unclear
whether the induction of negative affect directly causes
more aggressive responses or does so indirectly, by
causing more hostile attributions of intent that in turn
influence response aggressiveness.
Surprisingly, before the affect manipulation, mod-
erately and highly aggressive boys did not attribute
more hostile intent than nonaggressive boys. This
finding is inconsistent with findings in other studies
concerning hostile attribution of intent in comparable
samples with comparable instruments. A recent meta-
analytic review (Orobio de Castro et al., 2002) demon-
strated a robust significant relation between hostile at-
tribution of intent and aggressive behavior in studies
comparing referred to nonreferred samples using am-
biguous provocation vignettes. It is not at all clear why
this relation was not found in this study. We explora-
torily tested for any relation between attribution of in-
tent and participant characteristics other than aggres-
sive behavior but found none. The previously
mentioned review did show that considerable unex-
plained variance in study outcomes remained after ac-
counting for known differences between studies in
methods and participant characteristics. It appears that
the hostile attribution effect only occurs with certain
combinations of measures and participants that we do
not yet fully understand. For example, participants
with similar aggression scores in seemingly compara-
ble studies may differ in kind of aggressive behaviors,
circumstances under which these behaviors occur,
or—more pertinent to our findings—their emotional
state while participating. Further studies of hostile at-
tribution of intent under different conditions, with dif-
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ferent measures, and in different populations are re-
quired to resolve this issue.
An important limitation of this study is the small
sample size. Unfortunately, inclusion of larger samples
was not feasible for a first trial with a new and fairly
taxing experimental manipulation in a clinical group.
For the within-participants tests of the experimental ef-
fect, group sizes were acceptable. However, for be-
tween-participants tests, the resulting low statistical
power was only sufficient to detect large effects. Small
to moderate group differences may therefore not have
been detected. Additional studies involving larger
samples are needed to replicate these findings. For
analyses within the highly aggressive group, the power
problem was aggravated by the ceiling effect for re-
sponse aggressiveness. Even though our coding system
accommodated highly aggressive responses, such as
hitting, kicking, and breaking other children’s posses-
sions, a large proportion of highly aggressive boys con-
sistently responded in these most severe categories,
even before the affect manipulation. Future studies
may need to devise scoring systems that allow for dis-
tinctions in severity of more serious kinds of aggres-
sive responses to prevent ceiling effects.
In past years, research on SIP, emotion, and aggres-
sion has helped improve assessment and treatment of
aggressive behavior problems (e.g., Hudley & Graham,
1993; Lochman & Lenhart, 1993). We hope this study
contributes to further improvements in several ways.
Concerning assessment, findings clearly show that hos-
tile attribution tendencies in highly aggressive boys are
particularly evident in a negative emotional state.
Therefore, diagnostic assessment of highly aggressive
boys’ SIP in conflict situations may require more emo-
tionally involving test procedures than those widely
used to date. There is a clear need for more emotionally
involving, reliable, and valid procedures to assess SIP
(see also Orobio de Castro et al., 2002). Standardized af-
fect manipulations like the computer game used in this
study may be a useful part of such procedures, as they
make it possible to assess SIP in different emotional
states. This would enable assessment of both optimal
SIP competence when “calm, cool, and collected” and
SIP performance in a negative emotional state and to as-
sess the discrepancy between the two. Concerning treat-
ment, the effect of negative feelings on SIP found in this
study underscores the need to extend social–cognitive
behavior training to real-life situations eliciting strong
negative affect (see, for example, Lochman & Lenhart,
1993). Given the effects of negative emotions on their
SIP, it is evidently insufficient to train highly aggressive
boys to solve hypothetical SIP puzzles without actual
emotional involvement. It may, however, be quite help-
ful for highly aggressive boys to learn to recognize their
own negative emotional states in time and to know that
their judgmentmaybesomewhatextremewhen theyare
in such a state.
Finally, the distinction made here between priming
and induction of negative emotion is not always pres-
ent in everyday life. In many cases, like in the Dodge
and Somberg (1987) study, a single social stimulus
does prime negative attributions and evoke negative
feelings. In this study, we needed to make a sharp dis-
tinction between the effects of priming and negative
emotion to be able to investigate their unique contribu-
tions to hostile attributions of intent by aggressive
boys. In real-life social interactions, the effects of neg-
ative feelings and priming of negative intent may co-
occur and together contribute to the escalation of social
conflicts with highly aggressive boys.
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